The paper analyzes Russia's perception of NATO since the beginning of its eastern enlargement. Russia's reaction to the enlargement evolved from attempts to diffuse its potential damage through a limited cooperation to passive and then active policies of containment. The latter have resulted in a risky behavior with respect to the alliance and a concentration of Russian military on the Western border. Two factors can assist us in explaining Russia's evolving perception of NATO from a potential partner to a renewed military threat – the historical experience of viewing the alliance, and the West in general, as potentially threatening and the post-Cold war interaction with NATO that served to strengthen the historically developed perception. As of today, Russia has learned from its interaction with the alliance that NATO remains a principle threat to Russia's national security and that through the alliance's expansion the West seeks to exercise its cultural, economic, and political domination in Eurasia.
Despite recent changes in international relations and lapse of time since the fall of the USSR, the issue of Russian membership in NATO has been an ongoing fact. Hence, the principle scope of the paper is SWOT analysis of potential Russian membership in NATO from the perspective of the Russian Federation. Through the introduction and evaluation of advantages and disadvantages of such membership in the light of latest geopolitical events in Eurasia suggested by academic and professional circles in NATO countries and Russia, the author proceeds with identification of fundamental strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats that Russia might face. Taking into account such determining factors as the size of its territory, shifting geopolitical conditions in the world, modern understanding of security and a potentially frozen dispute in Ukraine, he comes to the conclusion that benefits potentially brought by Russian membership in NATO could be sustained while drawbacks could be eliminated by incorporation of NATO to OSCE and a change in voting procedures of the Alliance.
NATO and Russia are locked in a self-reinforcing cycle of biased perceptions of each other. NATO and Russia entertain opposed world visions and conflicting narratives. This situation tends to create a ‘defensive inferiority’ syndrome that is explored. In turn, NATO’s advances in Russia’s ‘near abroad’ are perceived as a threat by the Kremlin, thus maximizing the potential for errors and unwanted provocation that could trigger military escalation. Against this background, Russia has been negatively engaging NATO members through direct and indirect destabilization. If there is no such thing as a primer for Russian warfare, the second part of the article l shows that the Kremlin’s strategy is far from unpredictable and can be defined as a ‘punish and spoil’ approach, i.e., a mix of brute force and unconventional means ranging from ‘hybrid’ warfare to ‘grey area diplomacy’.
Author(s): Taneski, Nenad; Naumovski, Toni; Kirkova, Rina.
In: Contemporary Macedonian Defense / Sovremena Makedonska Odbrana, vol. 17, no. 32, June 2017, p. 9-19.
Available to NATO staff only [Please contact the Library]
Abstract:Cooperation and partnership are supporting elements of NATO's operation, and the Alliance has focused on maximizing the value of its partnerships, especially in the context of hybrid threats. In order to facilitate the broader network of partners, the Alliance adopted a new partnership policy in April 2011. Experts frequently challenge the success of its implementation, because of the weaknesses and inconsistencies. The paper analyzes the wide network of partner relationships and initiatives with countries and organizations at the regional and global level. The focus is on the functionality and efficiency of NATO's partnership policy and its new tools, aimed at fostering and shaping new effective relationships with potential future and existing partners. The paper gives an overview of the established partnership relations of NATO with Russia and the crisis therein. One of the reasons for this milestone between NATO and Russia are the recent Russian military interventions. The paper is intended to stimulate critical thinking regarding the implementation of the NATO partnership policy.
This article argues that NATO is unable to challenge any of President Putin's expansive policies for two key reasons : first, Europe and the United States have conflicting views on what events qualify as key security threats (different threat perceptions). Infused within this paradigm is a nascent European Union strategic culture that views threats differently from the U.S. This in turn undermines NATO, as the Europeans argue for largely nonmilitary or more peacekeeping-oriented approaches to respond to threats that are quintessentially multilateral. Second, even though there are major differences between the NATO states and Russia, the two most pressing issues before the Atlantic Alliance are Iran and Syria. The NATO states know that a resolution to the Syrian civil war or to Iran's nuclear program is unlikely without the support of Moscow, which limits their ability to effectively challenge Russia. This article concludes with a call for NATO to focus on identifying a new agenda for the Atlantic Alliance, one that is more human-security oriented, as it addresses the root causes of instability in and around the Eurozone.
Abstract: The economic sanctions imposed by the West against Russia in 2014, following the latter’s aggression in Ukraine, were deliberately limited but nevertheless significant, their impact distinguishable from that of the fall in oil prices that occurred in late 2014. Edward Hunter Christie argues that these sanctions, in combination with credible threats of further sanctions, appear to have had an effect in limiting Russian aggression in Ukraine, even though they have not led to a reversal of facts on the ground. This article also explores the possibility that, in the absence of other coercive components to underpin diplomatic efforts, the earlier application of more robust economic sanctions might have had stronger effects on Russia’s behaviour
ABSTRACT: Assessing missile defence through the prism of offence–defence theory requires primarily an examination of legal and structural constraints on future development. New weapons technology is frequently cited as having the most critical impact on the offence–defence balance. Yet, the method for assessing the introduction of a new weapons technology tends to neglect projected maturity and instead focus excessively on the initial rudimentary capabilities. It is argued here that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO’s) missile defence is set to incrementally become more advanced in terms of quality, quantity and mobility, which is supported by a strategy that is increasingly favouring offence. As the system gradually enhances the offensive advantage vis-à-vis Russia, NATO categorically rejects any legal or structural constraints on future deployments.
Entwicklungsszenarien fur die NATO-Russland-Beziehungen
L'Occident a-t-il promis en 1990 quelque chose a la Russie en ce qui concerne l'OTAN et l'Europe ? Certains l'affirment et en concluent qu'en ne tenant pas ces promesses l'Occident a 'humilie' la Russie.
Abstract: "The Russian intervention in Ukraine can be seen not as an isolated incident, but as part of a larger strategy aimed at re-establishing Russian control and influence over its near abroad – a sphere of influence severely diminished with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Building on its success in Georgia, the Russian Federation moved aggressively in 2014 to seize Crimea and destabilise eastern Ukraine. In each case, Russia leveraged ethnic Russian populations to encourage separatist movements, introducing Russian paramilitaries, intelligence operatives, special forces and eventually conventional forces. In this hypothetical scenario, written as a ‘historical perspective’, Richard D Hooker, Jr examines a possible next move against the Baltic States, where similar conditions apply. Should Russia move against the Baltics, NATO will face its most challenging test in a generation."
Abstract: The article discusses political conditions in Europe at the end of the Cold War in 1989, focusing on the destruction of the post-Cold War security order by the actions of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Topics include Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea; attitudes towards European institutions such as the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and International Criminal Court; and the failure of soft power to check Putin's actions. A discussion of the ramifications of the U.S. and Europe's failure to formulate a cohesive response to Russian actions in Ukraine is also included.
ABSTRACT: This article provides an analysis of the ‘reset’ policy toward Russia, which was inaugurated in 2008 by the Obama administration and soon embraced by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It argues that, rather than being prompted by domestic dynamics in the United States, the ‘reset’ was a response to systemic pressures. More specifically, the West's relative decline on the international system, the retrenchment of expeditionary NATO, and the rise of potentially revisionist powers. Although prompting an improvement in the relationship, these pressures failed to bring about Russia's full integration into the post-Cold War Western international settlement. In the immediate aftermath of the 2008 Russian–Georgian War, NATO's relations with Moscow experienced an initial revitalization through a resumption of the works of the NATO–Russia Council (NRC), the signing of a New Start Treaty between the United States and Russia in 2010, and an expansion of supply lines to Afghanistan through Russian territory. However, there was no real incentive for both sides to truly ‘reset’ the relationship. The alliance never treated Russia equally, preferring instead to dictate conditions. Any discussion of Russian–NATO relations was couched in this context; the ‘reset’ was also conceived as a small gift to Moscow. For its part, the Kremlin never accepted a junior partner status, making it clear that its preferred option remains the alliance's dissolution and the creation of a different, new pan-European organization that would incorporate the Russian Federation as a full member. The article concludes that, despite the mixed achievements of the ‘reset’, the alliance retains a systemic incentive to seek durable cooperation with Russia.
ABSTRACT: In 2007, Russia suspended a number of its obligations under the CFE Treaty. After a series of negotiations to persuade Russia to revert to compliance, to no avail, the USA and certain other States Parties to the CFE Treaty equally suspended a number of their treaty obligations in 2011. The CFE Treaty itself has a provision neither on suspensions nor on reactions to suspensions or violations. In contrast, general international law offers two possible reactions to treaty violations: suspension as a response to a material breach of a multilateral treaty under the law of treaties; countermeasure as a response to any violation under the law of State responsibility. Against this theoretical backdrop, the reaction by the NATO allies to the Russian suspension of the CFE Treaty is examined. The theoretical framework is beneficial in illustrating the contrasting consequences: the negative restoration of balance as a consequence of a treaty suspension, and the positive restoration of the treaty relationship as the intended consequence of a countermeasure. The article purports to show the benefit of grasping the present case as a countermeasure. It also argues that the chosen reaction by the NATO allies is an exemplary countermeasure, in that they have selected bilateralisable obligations that only affect their relationship with Russia; it leaves the treaty relationship among the rest of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty intact. The article then discusses the limitation of the chosen theoretical framework, namely, the artificial differentiation between a countermeasure and a treaty suspension.
SHERR, J. (2011). SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES, vol. 11, issue 3, Special Issue: Managing Distrust in the wider Black Sea Region, p. 279-298. Available to NATO staff only [Please contact the Library]
"The Russia–Georgia war of August 2008 re-established the saliency of hard power in the Black Sea region. Yet security realities have turned out far differently than most at the time expected. NATO enlargement is off the table, but NATO’s partnerships – not least of all with Georgia – are far from moribund. Russia’s discontent with the international order is overshadowed by its despondency about itself. Its radical defence reform has produced turmoil rather than coherence. Its geopolitical advances have produced few geopolitical advantages. Georgia and Ukraine each retain the capacity to dishearten supporters and exasperate antagonists. The loss of Abkhazia and South Osetia has neither weakened Georgia nor its president. Ukraine’s pre-emptive concessions to Russia have neither diminished Russian pressure nor Ukraine’s determination to resist it. Although Turkey remains a determinant regional actor, it is more preoccupied with Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and its own domestic problems than with its northern neighbourhood. For all this, the region remains defined by asymmetry of interest, capacity and perception – and distrust. It would be unwise to expect predictability and prudent to expect the unexpected." [FROM ABSTRACT]
This article discusses Russian perceptions of and attitudes toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia has historically disliked and mistrusted NATO, seeing it as the primary threat to its international aspirations; in practice Russia pursues a dual policy. Its harsh condemnation of NATO has not stopped it from cooperating in selected areas of mutual interest. The most important among them is support for NATO's military operations in Afghanistan. The recent rejuvenation of relations between the west and Moscow is known as the strategic 'reset', meaning a return to diplomatic contacts and limited cooperation regardless of disagreements over the invasion of Georgia and Moscow's other recent international transgressions. The reset in NATO-Russia relations has only tactical significance, however. Cooperation will take place on a limited basis, but a genuine reset in mutual relations must wait for a reset in Russia's political and strategic priorities.[ABSTRACT]
The article dicusses the conditions, obstacles and prospects for a modernisation partnership with Russia as a way to improve European security and relations between Russia and the West in general, including Russia's NATO membership. [ABSTRACT]
Georgian Readiness for NATO Membership after Russian-Georgian Armed Conflict
KRIZ, Z. & SHEVCHUK, Z. (March 2011). COMMUNIST AND POST-COMMUNIST STUDIES, vol. 44, no. 1, p. 89-97. Available only in print [Please contact the Library]
Quo Vadis, NATO? A Glance from Lisbon
PETROVSKY, P. & DEDUSHKIN, V. (February 2011). INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations, No. 1, p. 49-57. Available only in print [Please contact the Library]
WHERE IS NATO going? Recently the question has moved to the center of attention of the analytical, academic and diplomatic communities in Russia and abroad. The Portuguese are as concerned as the rest of the world. Indeed, the disappearance of the Soviet Union left its ideological adversary, the North Atlantic Alliance, a Cold War product, at a crossroads. The NATO-centrism principle cracked under the impact of the multi-polar world which has finally taken shape. In recent years, few sided with the deliberations about NATO as the cornerstone of global security and the "world policeman": this is popular only among certain NATO members still living in the past. The European security and defense policy for each member state, the core of the EU Security Doctrine, envisaged stronger extra-NATO military capabilities. Passions flew high at the numerous scientific-political seminars held in Lisbon on the eve of the NATO summit; some people doubted that the world still needed NATO at all. A sort of "know-how" was required to preserve the accumulated potential and go on living while the member-countries were slashing their military budgets. In 2011, the NATO staff will be trimmed from 13.5 to 9 thousand; 7 command and control structures will replace the present 11. NATO will concentrate at supplies, purchases, maintenance, logistics, communications, and intelligence. The means as well as the aims were in short supply: NATO needed at least a hypothetical or, better still, potential enemy.
It turned up at the dawn of the 21st century: 09/11 was followed by new challenges and threats, a life-buoy for NATO. On 20 November 2010, the NATO leaders headed by Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen who gathered in Lisbon confirmed their resolution to fight the new threats and challenges - international terrorism, proliferation of WMD and missile technologies, piracy, cyberattacks, drug trafficking. [ABSTRACT]
Authors: Pavel Petrovsky, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the Portuguese Republic. Vladimir Dedushkin, counsellor at the RF Embassy in the Portuguese Republic.
Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008 proved a military and diplomatic overstretch, leading to the suspension of the NATO-Russia Council and a frosty period with the North Atlantic Alliance. Moscow’s recent co-operative efforts were rewarded with a ‘reset’ with the US and renewed strategic dialogue at the NATO Lisbon summit in 2010, but is this really a new Russia? Jakub Kulhanek argues that the much-lauded rapprochement may achieve very little progress while heralding the potential return of distrust and suspicion in NATO-Russian relations.
COWAN, G. (January 2011). JANE'S INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE REVIEW, vol. 44, nr.1, p. 6. Available to NATO staff only [Please contact the Library]
Russia, NATO and the International Societies : Models, policies, Strategies
MAKARYCHEV, A. (2011). One of the chapters of the book "Perceptions of NATO and the New Strategic Concept", edited by L. N. Rodrigues and V. Dubovyk, p. 75-84 (IOS Press, 2011) Available only in print [Please contact the Library]
Russia-NATO Partnership at the Crossroads
SOKOLOVA, P. (2011). One of the chapters of the book "Perceptions of NATO and the New Strategic Concept", edited by L. N. Rodrigues and V. Dubovyk, p. 85-92 (IOS Press, 2011) Available only in print [Please contact the Library]
"Missile defence will be high on NATO's agenda in November 2010, when heads of state and government meet for their next summit in Lisbon. A prominent issue for the Alliance, it received a boost in September 2009 when the Obama administration presented new plans for a phased, adaptive deployment of missile defence assets in and around Europe. But any decisions will need to take Russia's perspective into account." [FROM ABSTRACT]
Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO and Russia have a unique window of opportunity to overcome their legacy of mistrust. The opportunity arises from the convergence of the United States-Russian 'reset', improvements in Russia's relations with some of its Western neighbours, the strategic impact of the global financial crisis, and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's proposals on the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. If properly grasped, it is an opportunity to put the NATO-Russia relationship on a course towards a patient, pragmatic partnership across a broad but manageable range of important strategic questions in which the interests of each are fully engaged. [ABSTRACT FROM THE AUTHOR]
Jakub Kulhanek is head of the East European Programme at the Association for International Affairs in the Czech Republic and currently with the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham (UK).