The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is charged with defending the United States,
its deployed forces, and regional allies from missile attacks. MDA executes this
mission through a layered system of capabilities, known as the Missile Defense
System. Individual systems known as elements—for example, interceptors
intended to destroy missiles in flight—provide these capabilities.

The article focuses on the training course conducted by the U.S. Army at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, for Ukrainian soldiers on the Patriot missile defense system. Topics discussed include the advantages of the U.S. system, such as automation and fewer cables compared to the Russian systems the Ukrainians were accustomed to, the real-world experiences of the Ukrainians, and the training curriculum, which covers operator and maintainer tasks.

Amid an intensifying rivalry with the United States, China is modernizing and significantly expanding its nuclear forces. These developments fuel concerns that China's traditional nuclear strategy premised on a limited nuclear arsenal for assured retaliation and a no-first-use policy is undergoing a major shift. Using Chinese-language materials, an examination of Chinese debates about China's security environment and the future direction of its nuclear strategy finds that a nuclear-conventional entangled security dilemma is emerging between the United States and China.

The article reports that the Raytheon Technologies has been awarded a three-year contract by the US army to upgrade and insert technology into the Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) radar, which will ultimately replace the current Patriot missile radars. It mentions that the radar has a strategic role in building the LTAMDS solution system to help defeat quickly evolving missile threats such as hypersonic weapons.

Russia's nuclear and missile defense capabilities ensure its status on the global stage. In addition to protecting the homeland, contemporary Russia's air and missile defense systems (AMDS) are harnessed as tools to undermine the West and contribute to the Kremlin's global ties. Since the Cold War, Russia has sought to establish a global footprint; AMDS has served the Russian state as a reliable agent to expand its influence while simultaneously constraining that of the West, and in particular, the United States. Understanding how Russia employs AMDS will prove crucial to comprehending Russia's global objectives and interests.

The article focuses on Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations. It mentions role the Aegis BMD program should play in defending the U.S. homeland against attack from intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). It also mentions Aegis BMD program in a new missile defense system architecture.

North Korea has made significant strides in its attempt to acquire a strategic nuclear deterrent. In 2017, it tested intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and completed a series of nuclear test explosions. These may provide North Korea with the technical foundation to deploy a nuclear-armed ICBM capable of striking the United States. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) missile defense system is intended to deter North Korean nuclear coercion and, if deterrence fails, to defeat a limited North Korean attack. Despite two decades of dedicated and costly efforts, however, the GMD system remains unproven and unreliable. It has not demonstrated an ability to defeat the relatively simple and inexpensive countermeasures that North Korea can field. The GMD system has suffered persistent delays, substantial cost increases, and repeated program failures because of the politically motivated rush to deploy in the 1990s. But GMD and other U.S. missile defense efforts have provoked serious concerns in Russia and China, who fear it may threaten their nuclear deterrents. Diplomacy and deterrence may reassure Russia and China while constraining North Korea's nuclear program. An alternate airborne boost-phase intercept system may offer meaningful defense against North Korean missiles without threatening the Russian or Chinese deterrents.

This paper discusses specific types of missile attacks the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) might launch in a conflict and identifies the key sources of uncertainty that US and allied political and military leaders must take into account in assessing how effective defense systems might be in stopping these attacks. A key finding is that while missile defenses might be able to blunt some kinds of attacks, the DPRK will have options for retaliatory missile attacks that can reach their targets despite the presence of defenses, and Pyongyang will know which options those are. The existence of this second set of cases is crucial for US and allied leaders to recognize if they are considering taking actions under the assumption that defenses will be effective in protecting US and allied populations.

The article discusses American Army's modernized air and missile defense capabilities. Topics discussed include the major achievement is fielding of Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) vehicles to American troops in Europe, discussed the Integrated Air and Missile Defense operational test which if successful could change the way the service's air and missile defense formations fight; and discussed the emerging technologies in the field of Air and Missile Defense Cross-Functional Teams.